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NOTE
Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade
Secret Analysis
Jennifer L. Saulino

INTRODUCTION

For ten years, William Redmond, Jr. , worked for PepsiCo, the
maker of the sports drink All-Sport.1 Redmond's status as General
Manager gave him access to trade secrets.2 PepsiCo protected those
trade secrets by contract, and, as is typical, PepsiCo required
Redmond to sign a confidentiality agreement covering all "confiden
tial information relating to the business of [PepsiCo]."3 This confiden
tiality agreement, like most of its kind, protected the company from
the danger that an employee who knew secret information would
change jobs and disclose that information.
In late 1994, Redmond accepted a position with Quaker's Gator
ade division, a major competitor of PepsiCo's All-Sport. Redmond's
new position held sufficient similarities to his position at PepsiCo that
PepsiCo had reason to fear he might use the secret information he
held. PepsiCo filed suit seeking a temporary injunction to prevent
Redmond from assuming his duties at Quaker and to prevent him
from disclosing trade secrets. PepsiCo's argument, which became the
defining element of the case and caused the case to become a pivotal
component of current trade secret law, was that Redmond would "in
evitably disclose" PepsiCo trade secrets in his new job at Quaker.4

1. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995).
2. "A trade secret may be broadly defined as any secret process, formula, program or

other confidential information that derives commercial value from being kept secret, where
the owner of the information has taken reasonable steps to protect that secrecy." 1 WILLIAM
c. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 2.01, at 2-1 (1999) (citing
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985).
3. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264.
4. See id. at 1266. Specifically, PepsiCo argued that, among other things, Redmond had
knowledge of its "Strategic Plan," an annually revised document containing competition
plans, as well as goals and strategies for manufacturing, production, marketing, packaging,
and distribution for three years. PepsiCo also cited its Annual Operating Plan (" AOP") as a
trade secret because it contained sensitive information about how PCNA (PepsiCo of North
America) priced its products in the marketplace. The AOP included customer development
agreements which detail how PepsiCo targeted potential customers. PepsiCo considered this
information a trade secret because it would allow competitors to anticipate pricing moves
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PepsiCo argued that it found itself "in the position of a coach, one of
whose players [had] left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team
before the big game. "5 The Seventh Circuit agreed and enjoined
Redmond from working for Gatorade for six months.6
One basic principle of trade secrets law is that employees owe a
duty to employers not to disclose information that qualifies as a trade
secret. Ordinarily, an employer may recover damages from, or secure
an injunction against, the misappropriation or disclosure of trade se
crets.7 An employee's general knowledge, on the other hand, is not
considered a trade secret.8 Inevitable disclosure lies between .these two
extremes. As this Note defines it, and as its history supports, inevitable
disclosure means that the employee's general knowledge and the em
ployer's trade secrets cannot be separated so that it would be "virtu
ally impossible"9 for the employee to do his or her new job without
using the former employer's secrets.10
As companies become more technologically based and employees
more mobile, the concept of inevitable disclosure likely will apply in
creasingly to trade secret disputes between employers and former em
ployees. 1 1 More and more, trade secrets are not concrete formulas that
a court could simply tell an employee not to disclose. Companies de
pend increasingly on ideas in such areas as technology or marketing,
as in PepsiCo. Even if a court granted an injunction against disclosure

and underbid strategically. Redmond not only had detailed knowledge of this information,
he had been involved in preparing PCNA's customer development agreements in California
and with California-based national customers. PepsiCo feared that Redmond could not pos
sibly do his job well at Quaker without using the knowledge he had of PepsiCo's strategic
plans to chart Quaker strategy.
5. Id. at 1270.
6. Id. at 1272.

7. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, § 3, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985).
8. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
9. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953 at *17
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978).
10. The defining element of inevitable disclosure is that, as the name would suggest, dis
closure will happen even in the best of good faith. As will be demonstrated, there are some
cases that seem to equate inevitable disclosure with threatened misappropriation and thus
require some demonstration of intent to disclose. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition
Agreement Exists: A dditional Guidance Needed, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 9 (2000).
As an increasing number of companies vie for the riches of the high-tech world, the value of
employees with technical knowledge and the knowledge of markets and customers continues
to rise. At the same time, however, employees are leaving their jobs with greater and greater
frequency to work for competitors or start their own businesses.

Id. (citing Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Employees' Duties and Liabilities:
Protecting Employer Confidences, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: WHAT
PLAINTIFFS & DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 347, 349 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 581, 1998)).
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of newer trade secrets, the employee would disclose inadvertently just
by doing his job.
PepsiCo was not the first case to invoke an argument of inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets.12 Yet, recognition of inevitable disclosure
by the Seventh Circuit gave the argument a legitimacy that sparked a
sharp increase in its use. Courts and commentators grappling with in
creasingly difficult trade secret disclosure issues latched onto the the
ory of inevitable disclosure as a panacea to the problem of how to
handle complicated cases of trade secrets held in former employees'
heads.13
Unfortunately neither the PepsiCo court, nor any court following
PepsiCo, has defined the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.14 Courts
analyze trade secrets cases by a standard, uniform method. The doc
trine of inevitable disclosure, however, emerged as j udges looked for
ways to correct inequities that did not fit into the trade secrets mold.
The birth of the inevitable disclosure doctrine was a solution to a
problem of equity. The PepsiCo court gave legitimacy and importance
to the doctrine as a part of trade secrets law but failed to give courts a

12. See, e.g., Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1978).
13. See, e.g., Lumex. Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F.D. Supp. 624, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Merck
Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (relying on PepsiCo); Cardinal
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999);
Novell v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 1998 WL 177721, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, (Utah
Jan. 30, 1998); Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies
Should Know About Hiring Competitors' Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 998 (1997); Pe
ter Huang, Preventing Post-PepsiCo Disaster: A Proposal for Refining the Inevitable Disclo
sure Doctrine, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & H IGH TECH L.J. 379, 405 (1999); "Inevitable"
Misappropriation After PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 537 PLI/Pat 1999, 201 (1998); Jay L. Koh,
From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the Inevitable Misappropria
tion of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1998) ("Following PepsiCo, an even
greater number of courts have discussed, adopted, and applied the inevitable misappropria
tion doctrine."); Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a
Former Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete A greement Nor Threatened to Use or
Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited from Working for a Competitor, 21 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 211, 228 (1997).
&

14. Over the past several years, three authors have proposed methods of imposing order
on the confused "doctrine" of inevitable disclosure, noting courts' inconsistencies. None of
them, however, has proposed to define the doctrine within the framework of the traditional
trade secrets analysis.
Over the last thirty years, a growing number of federal and state courts have wrestled with
employers' concerns regarding the disclosure of trade secrets in an attempt to develop a co
herent approach to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation. Unfortunately, the result has
been an inconsistent, unpredictable and undesirable patchwork of legal standards that ap
pears both inequitable and inefficient.

Koh, supra note 13, at 273-74; see also Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Dis
aster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 811 (1999) (referring to the "unde
fined and misapplied inevitable disclosure doctrine"); Suellen Lowry, Note, Inevitable Dis
closure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 519, 521 (1998) ("A brief sampling of typical inevitable disclosure decisions demon
strates that they are often not based on in-depth doctrinal analysis.").
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defined standard from which to build.15 If trade secrets law is to con
tinue to maintain its relative uniformity across the states, inevitable
disclosure needs formal definition as a doctrine.16
This Note argues that inevitable disclosure should become a stan
dard part of trade secrets analysis. Part I argues that courts should use
inevitable disclosure to fill the gap in standard trade secrets analysis
between the highly protected status of trade secret and the unpro
tected status of employee general knowledge. Part I concludes with a
blueprint for inevitable disclosure analysis that conforms with trade
secrets law in general. Part II argues that the definition outlined in
Part I is consonant with the historical development of inevitable dis
closure and trade secrets law. Part II demonstrates that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine developed as equity filled in where trade secrets
law created a gap. Part II then illustrates that the PepsiCo Court's
failure to provide a doctrinal framework for inevitable disclosure cases
has generated inconsistent judicial applications, demonstrating the
need for a uniform standard. This Note concludes that courts should
consider inevitable disclosure in a uniform fashion as a part of stan
dard trade secret analysis.
I.

INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE'S PLACE IN THE STANDARD TRADE
SECRET ANALYSIS

This Part proposes a definition of the right held by employers that
provides clear guidelines for the courts to apply. Furthermore, this
definition grants courts ample discretion to fashion remedies appro
priate to the facts of the particular case.17 Section I.A outlines the
analysis of a typical trade secret case and identifies the gap to be filled
by inevitable disclosure. Section I.B argues that inevitable disclosure
15. While some readers might question why a Seventh Circuit decision on a law that is
typically state-derived should matter to other courts, especially state courts outside the cir
cuit, PepsiCo has been extensively cited by courts across the country. See infra note 106.
Trade secrets law is largely uniform so the extent of the decision's impact is not surprising.
16. The historically low profile of trade secrets may explain why the natural combina
tion that would make inevitable disclosure a standard part of a trade secret analysis has not
yet been achieved.
In the field of intellectual property the trade secret is in a very real sense the "unsung hero."
One of the reasons for this is the fact that trade secret protection does not require bureauc
racies or government agencies. As a direct result, with the exception of a relatively small
number of attorneys who have chosen to become specialists in the field, there is not 'trade
secret bar' to compare to the cadre of dedicated professionals that is involved in the granting
and enforcing of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
1 TERRENCE F. MACLAREN, WORLDWIDE TRADE SECRETS LAW xxxv (1998).
17. While previous authors who addressed the inevitable disclosure confusion may not
have provided courts with much guidance on how to formulate their decisions, they did
rightly recognize the need for courts to remain sensitive to the unique consequences of re
stricting the employment options of an individual because of the rights of a former em
ployer. See infra note 60.
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should fill this gap and proposes a blueprint for incorporating inevita
ble disclosure into the trade secret analysis. The blueprint de-couples
the determination that disclosure is inevitable from the question of
remedy while still recognizing the necessity of an intensive case
specific analysis. This Part ultimately concludes that courts must for
mally recognize and define the inevitable disclosure doctrine in a uni
form fashion to best protect the rights of employers and employees.
A.

A Typical Trade Secrets Case - Identifying the Gap

The typical trade secrets analysis involves identifying a trade se
cret, identifying its actual or threatened disclosure, and fashioning a
remedy. The remedies for actual and threatened misappropriation18
differ. With actual disclosure, courts typically award damages. For
threatened misappropriation, courts should, ideally, grant an injunc
tion against disclosure or use. This procedure best serves the owner's
purposes because the secret remains a secret. The remedy phase is the
key to identifying the gap: a secret subject to inevitable disclosure, by
definition, cannot be enjoined.
The first step in the general trade secret analysis is a determination
that a trade secret exists. A trade secret is information that is valuable,
secret, and the subject of reasonable efforts by the employer to keep it
secret: "A trade secret may be broadly defined as any secret process,
formula, program or other confidential information that derives com
mercial value from being kept secret, where the owner of the informa
tion has taken reasonable steps to protect that secrecy. " 19 Unless a
trade secret exists, none of the remaining analysis matters. The defini
tion is broad so that a limitless amount of information could become a
"trade secret. "20 The moment information is publicly disclosed, how
ever, it loses its status as a trade secret, no matter how the disclosure

18. Misappropriation and disclosure are, for all intents and purposes under trade secrets
law, synonymous. The theory is that a trade secret, once disclosed, is no longer a trade secret
and that is how damage is done. Misappropriation is used as simply another word for disclo
sure - indicating that one only "misappropriates" (steals) a trade secret by wrongfully dis
closing and using it. "Threatened misappropriation" is unlawful under common law of trade
secrets and most state laws. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended
1985) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined."). The important point
here is that inevitable disclosure is the recognition of a category falling somewhere between
a blatant violation already recognized and prohibited by law and the disclosure of "general
employee knowledge" not considered a trade secret.
19. HOLMES, supra note 2, at § 2.01.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995):
It is not possible to state the precise criteria for determining the existence of a trade secret.
The status of information claimed as a trade secret must be ascertained through a compara
tive evaluation of all the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and definition of the
information and the nature of the defendant's misconduct.

Id.
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occurs.21 Information disclosed confidentially, however, remains secret
for the purposes of trade secrets definition.22 Causes of action for trade
secrets protection can be contractually based or premised in criminal
or tort theory.23
The basic elements of that cause of action are described in § 757 of
the Restatement of Torts:

One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to
do so, is liable to the other if:
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in
him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
( c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that
it was a secret and that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a
breach of his duty to the other. 24

Essentially, a person is liable for disclosing a trade secret if he
"stole" the secret or was entrusted with it through the course of em
ployment and knew it was a secret. Thus, the former employee can be
liable for disclosing a secret to a new employer and the new employer
can be liable for "stealing" the secret.25 This formulation of liability

21. HOLMES, supra note 2, at § 2.04, 2-17 ("Public disclosure of a trade secret destroys
the information's status as a protected trade secret - a result which follows whether the dis
closure was intentional, accidental, or even the result of someone else's wrongdoing.").
22. Id. § 2.03 at 2-13 to 2-14:
The courts recognize the necessity of certain con fidential disclosures if the trade secret
owner is to effectively carry out its trade or business . . . the courts hold that if the nature of
the disclosure gives rise to an express or implied obligation of confidentiality, the person re
ceiving the information will be held to that obligation, and the mere fact of disclosure will
not itself forfeit trade secret status . . . .

Id.

23. Id. § 2.04 at 2-15. While many states have criminal sanctions for certain types of
trade secrets misappropriation, even the federal government criminalized knowing and in
tentional misappropriation by federal law. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-294 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This Note focuses on those causes of
action arising out of the common law and statutory actions for tortious misappropriation of
trade secrets. Recall that "misappropriation" and "disclosure" are synonymous in the trade
secrets world. See supra note 18.
24. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
25. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 101, 14 U.L.A. 438 (amended 1985).

"Misappropriation" means:

(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a
person who
(A} used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of
the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(II} acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
(111) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
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means that often trade secrets cases are brought jointly against the
former employee and the employee's new employer.
The "secret" part of the trade secret is crucial. If the owner of a
trade secret does not demonstrate efforts to keep it secret, a trade se
cret does not exist. Both the common law formulation and the Uni
form Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") contain a requirement of "reason
able measures" to keep the information secret.26 The case law on this
point varies as to how much effort is required to establish a "reason
able measure[] " and what combination of factors will suffice.27 For in
stance, courts have imposed requirements such as confidentiality
agreements,28 restricted access,29 or passwords for computer material.30
Once the existence of a trade secret is established, misappropria
tion under the UTSA and common law approaches takes two basic
forms: actual or threatened misappropriation. Both actual and threat
ened misappropriation are considered unlawful. Courts engage in a
fact-specific inquiry as to whether the former employee actually dis
closed and/or the new employer actually used the secret or whether
one of the two has threatened to do so.
After a finding of trade secret misappropriation, the courts move
on to remedy.31 Courts commonly measure damages either as a func
tion of the plaintiff's actual economic injury, a function of the defen
dant's wrongful gain from exploitation of the trade secret in a restitu
tion or unjust enrichment theory, or a reasonable royalty for the

(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know that it
was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.

Id.
26. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.04 (2000) ("Essen
tially, the courts require that a trade secret owner take reasonable measures to protect se
crecy. Some courts might phrase the requirement more stringently to suggest that secrecy
should be protected to the extent possible.") (citations omitted); see also 14 U.L.A. 438
(amended 1985):
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de
vice, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Id.
27. See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 1.04.
28. See, e.g., Tyson Metal Prods., Inc. v. McCann, 546 A.2d 119, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
29. See, e.g., Capsonic Group, Inc. v. Plas-Met Corp., 361 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1
1977).
30. See, e.g., Schalk v. State, 767 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. App. 1988).
31. HOLMES, supra, note 2 ("Once the basic elements of a cause of action have been
established, a wide range of relief may be requested.").

March 2002]

Inevitable Disclosure

1 191

purchase of the right to use the secret.32 In cases of threatened misap
propriation and sometimes in cases of actual misappropriation, courts
fashion an injunction preventing the competitor from using or dis
closing the secret. Because the secret, once disclosed, is no longer con
sidered a trade secret, disclosure can mean great economic loss to the
former employer.
Unfortunately, sometimes information can be hard to classify.
Concrete formulas can be identified as secret and are either disclosed
or not. If an employee holds a formula in his head, he can be told not
to reveal it. Other information might not be easily classified as either
the company's secret or the employee's general knowledge. Employ
ees' general skills, knowledge, and experience are not considered
trade secrets.33 As the Restatement on Unfair Competition recognizes:
Information that forms the general skill, knowledge, training, and expe
rience of an employee cannot be claimed as a trade secret by a former
employer even when the information is directly attributable to an in
vestment of resources by the employer in the employee . . .. Whether
particular information is properly regarded as a trade secret of the for
mer employer or as a part of the general skill, knowledge, training, and
experience of the former employee depends on the facts and circum
stances of the particular case.34

This Restatement section addresses a problem within the competitive
marketplace; namely, while employees gain skills from their employ
ers, they should not be prevented from changing jobs. It shows that
courts developed the common law theory that general employee
knowledge could not be protected as a trade secret. This passage from
the Restatement, though, highlights that exactly what qualifies as gen
eral knowledge has always been considered a case specific determina
tion.
Courts have long wrestled with the distinction between general
knowledge and experience and specific trade secret knowledge.35 Some

32. Id. ("Punitive damages have also on occasion been awarded, as have been attorney's
fees in exceptional cases . . . . Potentially the most valuable remedy, however, will be an ac
tion for injunctive relief.").
33. See MILGRIM, supra, note 26, at § 5.02(3][a] (citations omitted); see also
Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC, 47 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995).
35. See, e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1 199, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (proclaim
ing of the general skills and knowledge acquired in the course of employment, "Those are
things an employee is free to take and to use in later pursuits, especially if they do not take
the form of written records, compilations or analyses."); S. l. Handling Sys. , Inc. v. Heisley,
581 F. Supp. 1553 (E.D. Penn. 1984):
In this context "know-how" takes on a meaning far beyond simply assembling components.
Rather, it is the ability, gained from trial and error, experimentation and the expenditure of
many dollars in investment which collectively gave to S. l. this type of know-how. This know
how is distinguishable from an individual's general knowledge and skill.

Id.; Trilog Ass'n., Inc. v. Famularo, 314 A.2d 287, 291-94 (Pa. 1 974) (distinguishing between
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courts have found the distinction almost impossible to make because
the information is inseparable from the employee, and yet still a trade
·secret. A gap in the definitional coverage of trade secrets law has de
veloped.36
B.

A "Typical" Inevitable Disclosure Case - Filling the Gap

If inevitable disclosure is a trade secrets doctrine, courts should
follow the same three step process of identifying the secret, identifying
whether it has been or will be disclosed, and fashioning a remedy.
Traditional trade secrets law leads to solutions for most problems of
how to protect secrets. Trade secrets law is not equipped, however, to
deal with a secret that is inseparable from an employee - that is the
gap that inevitable disclosure must fill. The most consistent and effec
tive way to give structure to inevitable disclosure is to begin with a
narrow definition of what the doctrine encompasses. This doctrinal
framework leaves other trade secret issues in their established catego
ries. For instance, cases of actual misappropriation should never be
confused with inevitable disclosure. This Section proposes a narrow
definition of inevitable disclosure and explain the necessity of keeping
the steps separate.
The need to define the doctrinal framework of inevitable disclo
sure arises from its possible confusion with threatened misappropria
tion. Cases of threatened misappropriation already are provided for
by statute and common law. As Section A discussed, threatened mis
appropriation is unlawful and is easily analyzed under regular trade
secrets analysis: 1) decide whether a trade secret exists; 2) decide
whether someone threatens disclosure; and 3) craft the appropriate
remedy. Several courts, however, including the PepsiCo court, have
conflated threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure in or
der to grant an injunction.37 The two are distinct and courts should
recognize the distinction.38

knowledge of the employee and confidential information of the employer by demonstrating
that any intelligent, talented computer programmer could have accomplished the same tasks
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs former employer's confidential information.).
36. See, e.g., Superior Consultant Co. v. Bailey, No. OO-CV-73439, 2000 WL 1279161
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2000) (limiting PepsiCo to its facts and finding the facts of Bailey in
compatible but evidencing a desire for a reconciliation of the general knowledge/trade secret
dichotomy).
37. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen we couple
the demonstrated inevitability that Redmond would rely on . . . trade secrets in his new
job . . . with the district court's reluctance to believe that Redmond would refrain from dis
closing these secrets [we conclude the injunction is proper]."); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar,
938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("It is sufficient to show the threat of misappropria
tion . . . . The threat of misappropriation is very real. Defendant's position with plaintiff gave
him such intimate knowledge of plaintiff's research, product development, finances, mar
keting strategies and pricing information that it is all but inevitable that he will utilize that
knowledge . . . . ); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
"
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Inevitable disclosure doctrine fills the gap between actual misap
propriation and employee general knowledge by addressing non
malicious or unintentional but nonetheless inevitable disclosure. It
provides a remedy when an injunction against disclosure will not suf
fice because the information is inseparable from the employee. Thus,
the information is recognized as a trade secret and not employee gen
eral knowledge, yet the employee is not acting in bad faith nor actually
threatening disclosure.
The important distinction between inevitable. disclosure·· and
threatened misappropriation is one of remedy. Threatened misappro
priation can be remedied by an injunction against disclosure, which
brings with it court sanctions. Inevitable disclosure is a much more se
rious problem, because an injunction against disclosure will not work.
The only remedy is an injunction against the employee working in
some defined sector of his or her field. The remedy typically will be an
injunction against employment but with compensation. 39
Obviously, employers prefer an injunction against employment no
matter the type of case because a court order may not deter a threat
ening employee.40 The implications for the affected employee, how
ever, necessitate that the law not allow employers such a cushion.
With inevitable disclosure, evidence of bad faith or ill-intent is not a

("Plaintiffs seek an injunction based on threatened misappropriation under a theory of 'in
evitable disclosure.' "); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Serv., Inc., 987
S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999):
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court found that Cardinal had no compunction
about suing or disclosing information covered under Hunt's confidential agreement to gain
an unfair advantage. We believe such evidence and findings are more than sufficient to show
a threatened or inevitable misappropriation of Hunt's trade secrets.
Id.; Strata Mktg., Inc. v. Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct., Dec. 6, 2000) ("[Plain
tiff) argues that it pied actual and threatened/inevitable disclosure in its complaint and urges
us to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine.").

38. For instance, a recent article in the Rhode Island Bar Journal on litigating covenant
not to compete and trade secret cases said of the UTSA: "The Act provides for injunctive
relief to enjoin both actual and threatened misappropriation. Thus, even in cases in which
actual misappropriation has not yet occurred, courts have enjoined potential misappropria
tion if the likelihood of 'inevitable disclosure' exists." Mark W. Freel & Matthew T. Oliverio,
When Commercial Freedoms Collide: Trade Secrets, Covenants Not to Compete and Free
Enterprise, 47 RI. BAR J. 9, 41 (May 1999).
39. This Note agrees with other authors on this topic that the obvious power inequity
between employees and employers in these situations should lead courts to explore creative
remedies such as an injunction coupled with a salary compensation by the former employer.
See infra note 60.
40. Cases that do not distinguish between threat and inevitable disclosure only �onfuse
the issue. See, e.g., Allis -Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (determining that "[a] trade secret will not be protected by the ex
traordinary remedy of injunction on the mere suspicion or apprehension of injury. There
must be a substantial threat of impending injury before an injunction will is.sue"). The court
emphasized the word "threat" but decided the case on inevitable disclosure. See id.
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part of the analysis.41 If bad faith is present - if disclosure is actually
threatened - then threatened misappropriation has occurred and the
court should fashion an injunction against disclosure.
Because inevitable disclosure is not yet part of the standard analy
sis, courts faced with a situation where a trade secret will be disclosed
by virtue of the new employment often decide that an injunction
should issue and then look for a reason why, grasping the term inevi
table disclosure.42 This approach worked well in the past because
courts could rest their justifications on equity.43
In an inevitable disclosure case, the first and most important step
for a court is to decouple the decision as to which type of trade secrets
case the court has in front of it from the remedy the court might im
pose. Courts trying to fashion a unique remedy for inevitable disclo
sure cases have confused the issue by making the remedy part of the
reasoning.44 The definition of inevitable disclosure and the remedy are
somewhat intertwined because inevitable disclosure is easiest to iden
tify when an injunction against disclosure will not be enough. In inevi
table disclosure cases, the relief is by necessity equitable: an injunction
against employment, maybe for a specified period of time, and per
haps with compensation. The trial court has much room for individu
alized tailoring because with inevitable disclosure there is no real
"wrongdoer."45 Further, courts are rightly sensitive to the problems in
evitable disclosure doctrine creates for the principle of employee mo
bility. The best solution to these problems, however, is not to ignore
standard analysis, blend it all together, and call it equity but, rather, to
decouple the identification of inevitable disclosure from the remedy.
Decoupling definition from remedy will bring inevitable disclosure
in line with standard trade secrets analysis. The UTSA decouples the
remedy from the analysis in a regular trade secrets case by defining
"trade secrets," "misappropriation," and "improper means" in section
one, addressing injunctions in section two46 and addressing damages in

41. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal.
1999) ("The (inevitable disclosure] theory allows plaintiff employers to demonstrate threat
ened misappropriation without evidence of an employee's intent to disclose trade secrets.")
(interpreting PepsiCo and other cases).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 941 F. Supp. 101
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (working backward from the prospect of an injunction, saying that it does
not believe that the future risk of disclosure is "of a degree that would warrant injunction").
43. See infra Section H.B.
44. See infra Section H.B.
45. See FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'!, 677 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1982) (determining that the
disclosure of trade secrets would be at least likely if not "inevitable," then balancing the
hardships to determine the remedy).
46. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1 985):
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section three.47
In an inevitable disclosure case, courts first determine whether a
trade secret exists or whether the information is general employee
knowledge. At this point, the issue of inevitable disclosure emerges. If
the information is a trade secret (and not general knowledge) but sus
ceptible to inevitable disclosure (and not a trade secret whose disclo
sure is threatened), then the types of equitable remedies preventing
employment are available. Because the remedy involved in inevitable
disclosure cases is injurious to employee mobility, courts should be es
pecially careful to handle these cases in the proper order.
Once the decoupling is accomplished, the first step in the analysis
is to identify the alleged trade secrets and to determine whether they
properly hold trade secret status.48 What information qualifies as a
trade secret is determined by the definitional lines used by the state based on the Restatement or the UTSA. But all trade secret statutes
ask whether the employer used "reasonable measures" to keep the in
formation secret.49 At various times, courts have proposed lists of rea
sonable measures such as keeping visitors out of certain areas or re
quiring visitor passes or confidentiality agreements from vendors.50
If a trade secret may be inevitably disclosed, evidence of reason
able measures should include the employer's recognition of the possi
bility of inevitable disclosure. If an employer knows an employee is
likely to be exposed to trade secrets that inevitably will be disclosed if
the employee changes jobs, that employer's demonstration of reason-

Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an
injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction
may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commer
cial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation. (b) In excep
tional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable
royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited. Ex
ceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of
position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a
prohibitive injunction inequitable. (c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to pro
tect a trade secret may be compelled by court order.

Id.
47. Uniform Trade Secrets Act§ 3, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985):

§ 3 Damages: (a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary re
covery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation.
Damages can include both actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of
damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unau
thorized disclosure or use of a trade secret . . . .

Id.

48.

See supra

49.

See supra notes 26-30

50.

See

id.

note 25 and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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able efforts should include efforts to obtain a covenant not to compete
or, at the very least, a confidentiality agreement.51 An employer who
produces even an invalid covenant not to compete or confidentiality
agreement, produces at least some evidence of an attempt to bargain
with the employee at the outset over the protection of the secret.52
Evidence of protection from inevitable disclosure, of course, is limited
by the facts of the specific case. If, for instance, the employer is in a
state where covenants not to compete are presumptively invalid,
courts could not require evidence of that sort. Furthermore, special
employment facts would negate an inference that the employer did
not use reasonable means. For example, an employee may have
worked for the company since its creation, before anyone could have
foreseen inevitable disclosure. Nevertheless, for the employer who
had the opportunity to bargain with the employee at the outset,
knowing that the employee's mobility could be restricted by the
knowledge of trade secrets, the lack of effort to engage in that bar
gaining should affect the court's decision as to whether the employer
used reasonable means to keep the information secret.53
Only after the determination of trade secret status has been ac
complished and the inevitability of disclosure has been proven, should
the court move to the remedy phase. While the nature of the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure requires injunctive relief, judges should tailor
the injunction to the facts of the case.54 For instance, an invalid cove
nant not to compete may mean that the employee already has bar
gained for compensation for the inconvenience caused by the inability
to work for a competitor for a set amount of time. Such information
can help a judge to fashion the remedy. The possibility of inevitable
disclosure might also provide support for upholding a covenant not to
compete. But the two should be kept separate and distinct even when
both are offered as theories in the same case.55 In the absence of evi-

51. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 677 F.2d at 505 -06 (recognizing the possibility of inevitable
disclosure and then proceeding to analyze the efforts of the employer to keep the informa
tion secret, and concluding that the requirement of all employees with access to the confi
dential material to sign a confidentiality agreement helped to prove "reasonable measures").
52. See e.g., Baxter Int'l Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1 197 (8th Cir. 1992).
53. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1461 (determining that the failure to
seek a noncompetition agreement from the employee indicated that the type of confidential
information the employee possessed was of limited value).
54. See Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78 -474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953, *1722 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978) (holding injunction appropriate but awarding damages to em
ployee paid by old employer for the duration of the injunction). Although Emery was a pre
PepsiCo case, that history is directly relevant to choices now. Precisely because this doctrine
developed out of equity, see infra Section 11.B, courts should keep equitable principles in
mind while using the doctrine.
55. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 863-65 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (using the covenant not to compete to inform the determination of trade secrets:
"APAC's requirement that all new employees sign the nondisclosure agreement during their
orientation session . . . constitute[s] a 'reasonable effort under the circumstances' to protect
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dence of an attempt to bargain for a covenant, a remedy that makes an
employee effectively unemployable should be applied with care and
avoided if possible.56 Courts should consider the possibility of man
dating payment by the former employer to the employee of a suitable
salary to compensate for the loss of employability.57
The analysis of an inevitable disclosure case is thus fairly simple.
The case proceeds along the same line as any trade secret case with
room for the j udge to tailor the remedy to the situation.58 Moreover,
this analysis ensures that the identification of inevitable disclosure re
mains separate and distinct from the j udge's desire to find a remedy
for a difficult employment situation. Such an analysis will allow the
doctrine room to grow into itself, allowing for creativity in remedies.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine in its current confusing state is
often criticized as a means of bulldozing courts into allowing compa
nies to create covenants not to compete after employment has ended.59
That result is unfair to unsuspecting employees who suddenly find
themselves enjoined from seeking alternative employment. Standard
izing inevitable disclosure as part of the trade secret analysis alleviates
those fears. With the blueprint laid out herein, courts may not move
backward from deciding that a remedy is appropriate and then call the
case "inevitable disclosure. " They will be forced to carefully analyze
the existence of a trade secret first. That analysis must include a
showing of efforts by the employer to keep the information secret. If
the court finds that the employer was aware of the inevitability prob
lem, the court must also find that the employer tried to protect against
such an eventuality before it crafts a remedy that limits the unsus
pecting employee's mobility.60

the secrecy of these trade secrets"); Int'! Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 257-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (using a discussion of inevitable disclosure to inform the court's decision
about an injunction following the finding of an invalid covenant not to compete).
56. This was the concern of the Emery court even in the 1970s. See Emery, 1978 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15953, at *17-22
57. See id.
58. The more recent case of Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468,
474-75 (Ark. 1999), recognized this necessity while at the same time acknowledging formal
acceptance of the doctrine: "We support the chancellor's conclusion, for a finding of inevita
ble disclosure is determined largely by the evidence and testimony before the chancellor."
Id.
59. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1335-36 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Michele B. Fagin, Non-Compete by Non-Disclosure: The Doctrine
of Inevitable Disclosure, 28 COLO. LAW. 73, 75 (1999) ("The ability to prevent competition
does not rest solely on the terms and enforceability of written non-competes.").
60. All three of the other authors who have extensively studied the problem and pro
posed solutions have done so with the objective of protecting employees. See Koh, supra
note 13, at 308 ("Thus, current court approaches to the doctrine . . . generate significant in
equitable and inefficient results as well as an undesirable, generally pro-employer bias that
discounts or ignores fundamental employee interests and resources."); Lowry, supra note 14,
at 520 (claiming one of the major premises of the note to be that "the inherent flexibility of
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While this approach does not seem to take into account em
ployer/employee power discrepancies, it does give both employers and
employees parameters for structuring their contractual relationships.61
A consistent doctrinal analysis forces employers to consider the value
of the trade secret upon hiring - before the employees lose the ability
to compete. Formal definition helps both sides of this debate by re
moving the incentive to use inevitable disclosure as a wild card in liti
gation.62 Employers gain a certainty as to their rights, and yet unsus
pecting employees are protected - especially if courts adopt the
principle that failure to sign a covenant not to compete or confidenti
ality agreement suggests a lack of reasonable efforts to keep the in
formation secret. Further, the decoupling of determination of inevita
ble disclosure from the remedy should promote honesty and clarity in
court opinions. A coherent doctrine will enable courts to explicitly de-

the current approach may subtly favor the interests of employers"); Whaley, supra note 14,
at 811 ("[T]hrough the use of the undefined and misapplied inevitable disclosure doctrine,
some courts that purport to be protecting the important value of trade secrets actually are
restricting competition and preventing employee mobility in a way contrary to the tradi
tional approach taken by many courts."). It seems likely that with this type of analysis the
concerns of inequities for employees would also be alleviated because courts would have
clear precedents as would lawyers drafting employment contracts.
61. See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999):
While the inevitable disclosure doctrine may serve the salutary purpose of protecting a com
pany's investment in its trade secrets, its application is fraught with hazards. Among these
risks is the imperceptible shift in bargaining power that necessarily occurs upon the com
mencement of an employment relationship marked by the execution of a confidentiality
agreement. When that relationship eventually ends, the parties' confidentiality agreement
may be wielded as a restrictive covenant, depending on how the employer views the new job
its former employee had accepted. This can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an em
ployer; the risk of litigation alone may have a chilling effect on the employee. Such con
straints should be the product of open negotiation.

Id.

62. See Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade
Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 151, 172 (1994):
The absence of a distinct legal rule gives both employees and their prospective employers an
incentive to capitalize on information that is not rightfully theirs. The employer may not be
able to assess whether the information is protectable as a trade secret. Moreover, the parties
will be uncertain as to who will ultimately prevail in litigation. The uncertainty of prevailing
combined with the high costs of litigation reduces the risk of loss to the employee who then
has a greater incentive to misappropriate. A more certain rule would help to adjust the risks
of litigation so that neither party will take advantage of an unclear rule.

Id.; see also Koh, supra note 13, at 304:
If an injunction is granted, the employee is generally not compensated for her lost employ
ment opportunities and the employer does not have to pay for the benefit of barring a com
petitor from acquiring a skilled employee . . . . On the other hand, if an injunction is denied,
an employer will not be compensated for harm . . . while the employee does not have to pay
for the value she received from exposure to such trade secrets.

Id.
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tail how they determined the appropriate remedies for balancing mo
bility of employees or competitiveness of employers.63
One district in California formally and explicitly recognized the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure.64 That court came to its conclusion by
going through the UTSA definition and then examining other courts'
use of inevitable disclosure - the first of those being PepsiCo.65 This
court's finding that the state's adoption of the UTSA naturally leads to
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure bolsters the argument that courts
should strive for coherent definition. A federal court applying state
law in the same state, however, rejected the doctrine as against the
public policy of employee mobility in Califomia.66 With the definition
outlined in this Note, the doctrine takes on a narrow scope, forcing
employer accountability for "reasonable measures," and protecting

63. Koh intuitively recognizes the benefits of decoupling during his discussion of the
merits and downfalls of a concurrent property interest approach: "Courts could determine
inevitability of misappropriation separately from the appropriate remedy, thereby creating a
more consistent set of precedents for the inevitability determination." Koh, supra note 14, at
315-16.
Recent cases suggest that courts may be moving in the direction suggested by this Note.
These recent cases seem to be trying to give some concrete definition while recognizing the
need for uniformity. See, e.g., Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 299:
[I]n cases that do not involve the actual theft of trade secrets, the court is essentially asked to
bind the employee to an implied -in -fact restrictive covenant based on a finding of inevitable
disclosure . . . . Thus, in its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads an exceed
ingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory. Absent evidence of actual misap
propriation by an employee, the doctrine should be applied in only the rarest of cases. Fac
tors to consider in weighing the appropriateness are . . . .
Id.; Bendinger, 994 S.W.2d at 474 ("Recently, this court adopted the inevitable-disclosure
rule . . . . Because we have adopted the inevitable-disclosure rule, the only question to re
solve is whether Bendinger's employment with Kraft will result in a situation where Bend
inger will inevitably rely on Marshalltown's trade secrets."); Handy & Harman Elec. Materi
als Corp. v. Molex Inc., No. C.A. 99-6323, 2000 WL 1727355, at *9 (R.I. Super. Oct. 16, 2000)
(refusing to use theory of inevitable disclosure because there was no evidence of confidential
information). But see Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC, 47 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (de
ciding the case based on inevitable disclosure while glossing over its own recognition that
there was no evidence to suggest that information was in fact only known to the company once the court found no trade secret, the analysis should have ended).
64.

1999):

See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App.

Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable disclosure rule is rooted in
common sense and calls for a fact specific inquiry. We adopt the rule here. In ruling on a re
quest for a preliminary injunction, the trial court decides whether the disclosure of trade se
crets is "likely to result" or "impossible" not to result from the subsequent employment.
Id. That same court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in concluding that
the marketing plans at issue were not trade secrets and thus saw no basis for relief on that point.
See id. at 686 ("Because the strategies are not trade secrets, the fact that SBIR might
emulate them does not provide a basis for injunctive relief."). This opinion was subse
quently withdrawn by order of the California Supreme Court. Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, No. S085582, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Cal. Apr. 12, 2000).

65. See id. at 684.
66.

GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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the employee by allowing the j udge room to craft an appropriate rem
edy.
Other courts have explicitly asked for a formal doctrine. A Texas
court in 1999 determined:
We found no Texas case referring to a "doctrine of inevitable disclosure"
but one case from this court has recognized that a former employee may
be enjoined from using or disclosing the former employer's confidential
or proprietary information if the employee is in a situation where use or
disclosure is probable.67

This statement suggests that this court was looking for formal recogni
tion and definition and when it did not find any in Texas case-law his
tory, it refused to use the doctrine. The judge in Texas may have based
this decision on a broader concept of uniform trade secrets law. The
judge may also have thought that plaintiff was advancing a fanciful
theory. Either way, this case demonstrates the willingness on the part
of courts recently to accept the UTSA as definitive and reject unde
fined doctrines. The Texas court provides further support for a de
fined doctrine following the standard trade secret analysis.
II.

WHY THE SOLUTION WORKS

This Part argues that inevitable disclosure developed outside
regular trade secrets law and cites this divergent development as the
reason for the disjunction between them. Section II.A explains why
this Note assumes as a baseline that uniform trade secrets law is the
standard to which inevitable disclosure should conform.68 Section 11.B

67. Conley v. DSC Communications Corp., No. 05 -98-01051-CV, 1999 WL 89955, at *3
(Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1999). This language may have been motivated by the court's realiza
tion that the inevitable disclosure claim simply did not apply. Intent to misappropriate actu
ally existed.
68. The even more basic assumption upholding this Note is that inevitable disclosure
doctrine, properly formulated, fits neatly into the standard trade secret analysis. Other
authors who have seriously addressed the issue of what to do with the nebulous doctrine of
inevitable disclosure have attempted to categorize it as a property theory. This Note rejects
that categorization and recognizes that the solution must include a standard trade secret
analysis because trade secrets law is not a subset 'of property law.
Justice Holmes long ago acknowledged the problem with using a property analysis to
solve trade secret problems and recognized the analysis of trade secrets as distinct:
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, what
ever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied,
but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with
the plaintiffs . . . .

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). Another dis
tinctive aspect of trade secrets law is that a cause of action exists for "threatened misappro
priation" because disclosure kills the trade secret. This cause of action, specifically provided
for in the UTSA, allows for relief, for example, if an employee has made clear his disgrun
tlement and intent to harm the company by selling its secrets. See Uniform Trade Secrets
Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985). Recall also that employee general knowledge, while

Inevitable Disclosure

March 2002]

1201

argues that inevitable disclosure developed as a justification for equity
in certain employment situations, outside the sphere of trade secrets.
Section 11.C argues that PepsiCo visibly combined these two areas of
law, giving the impression that inevitable disclosure was a doctrine
arising out of trade secrets law, but never accounting for the inconsis
tencies in analysis. Section 11.C is bolstered by a demonstration of the
confusion exhibited by lower courts attempting to apply the PepsiCo
inevitable disclosure analysis. Part II ultimately concludes that the
standardization of definition and analysis proposed in Part I that
would fit inevitable disclosure into trade secret law is supported by the
historical development of both areas of law.
A.

The Uniformity of Trade Secrets Law

Trade secrets are governed by state law.69 Normally that fact might
mean the analysis is state- or region-specific, but most states have ad
hered to the definitions of trade secrets found in the Restatement of

obtained from the employer, is not considered a trade secret. As demonstrated, this aspect
ultimately creates the gap inevitable disclosure must fill.
The proposals of other authors are each unique and creative but lack coherence with the
rest of trade secret law. Lowry proposes a concurrent property interest solution - analogous
to the situation of the dissolution of community property marriages where partition of ten
ancies in common is done "in kind" when possible and by judicial sale otherwise. See Lowry,
supra note 14, at 540-41. She concludes that a concurrent property interest approach is the
best method by which to promote fairness to employees while still protecting employers. Un
fortunately, she attempts to impose a foreign structure onto a distinct area of law and fails to
provide a framework for judges faced with more difficult facts. Id. at 544 ("The concurrent
property doctrine is not a panacea for all uncertainties and inequities in trade secret lawsuits
where disputed information has become inextricably tied to occupational mobility."). Jay
Koh takes a different approach. See Koh, supra note 13, at 286 n.87 ("[T]his Article focuses
on inconsistencies in the methodology that courts use to determine inevitability of misap
propriation . . . and the remedies that courts apply . . . . [T]his Article rejects the concurrent
property rights regime that Lowry suggests . . . and instead suggests that the law of accession
provides a better property model . . . . "). Koh's solution is based on an ancient property law
theory of accession that developed to deal with physical property that was altered or im
proved by another. Id. at 321:
[I]n short, accession vests title and control of a combined piece of property in the owner of
its principal parts or in its primary transformer. Accession then directs the title holder to
reimburse the owner of the secondary parts of a combined piece of property or its secondary
transformer for her lesser contribution.

Id. But Koh's solution is subject to the same criticisms that he lays on Lowry - it provides
no justification or guidance to courts when faced with innocent employees and employers,
one of whom will be harmed by any remedy. Koh, supra note 13, at 316 (criticizing the rec
ognition of employee ownership interests for "jeopardizing the existing and important con
ceptions of unified ownership of trade secrets"), 317 (arguing that "[Lowry's] system pro
vides no justification for, or guidance to, the proportion of ownership that should be
allocated to each . . . . ).
"

69. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, as
Holmes recognizes, trade secrets actions often end up in federal courts due to diversity juris
diction or as a pendent state claim attached to a claim under federal law, such as patent or
trademark. See HOLMES, supra note 2, § 2.01, at 2-3 n.3 (2001).
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Torts.70 The Restatement of Torts dropped trade secrets in

1979 ·but

trade secrets are now addressed in the Restatement of Unfair Compe
tition.71 Furthermore, forty-two states and the District
of
Columbia have adopted the UTSA.72 The definitions of misappropria
tion and trade secrets found in the uniform act are derived from com
mon law history and comport with the general usage of most states.73
In W.C. Holmes' treatise on intellectual property law, he recognizes
that while trade secrets are governed by state law, they are examined
through uniform, overarching principles.74 Milgrim too discusses the
uniformity of state decisions and the reasons why:
While, by and large, decisions under the various UTSA will be deter
mined by state courts in accordance with their interpretation of the form
of the UTSA adopted by that particular state, there are two forces out
side the state's own decisional mechanism that must be taken into ac
count. First, of course, is the provisions of § 8 of the UTSA, which en
courage uniformity of results among the various states enacting the

70. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 122 (Rev.

3d ed. 1993).

71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995):
A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other en
terprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others . . . . Liability for the appropriation of a trade secret thus rests on a
breach of confidence or other wrongful conduct in acquiring, using, or disclosing secret in
formation.
Id.; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70; MILGRIM, supra note 26, § 1.01(1) at 1-19 to 1-20:

Through conscious decision, the Reporters of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, omit
ted numerous sections of the original RESTATEMENT on the grounds that the subject matter
covered falls outside traditional tort law, and are embraced within the law of Unfair Compe
tition and Trade Regulations: "The rules relating to liability for harm caused by unfair trade
practices developed doctrinally from established principles in the law of Torts, and for this
reason the decision was made that it was appropriate to include these legal areas in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, despite the fact that the fields of Unfair Competition and Trade
Regulation were rapidly developing into independent bodies of law with diminishing reli
ance upon the traditional principle of Tort law. In the more than 40 years since that decision
was initially made, the influence of Tort law has continued to decrease, so that it is now
largely of historical interest . . . .
Id.

72. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, reprinted in 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED:
438 (Master ed. 1990 & supp. 1997).

CIVIL PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL LAWS

73. See id.
74. HOLMES, supra note 2, § 2.02 at 2 -9 (2000) (commenting on the differences between
the Restatement and UTSA approaches to trade secrets definitions and recognizing that the
"precise manner in which the definition [of trade secrets] has been applied" has varied from
court to court even within one state that has adopted the UTSA). Holmes also recognizes
that many courts use some variation of the six factors found in the Restatement of Torts in
order to evaluate trade secret cases, and concludes, after citing illustrative cases, that, "the
courts have repeatedly emphasized two closely related factors as paramount: the item must
be 'secret' and must not be 'public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or
business' (Id. at § 2-02, at 2-10, citing Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp. , 416 U.S. 470, 475
(1974)).
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UTSA. Second, are the general legal and/or equitable principles that
may be deemed to be of overriding constitutional effect.75

As Milgrim recognizes here, the UTSA itself encourages uniform
principles. A less abstract reason for uniformity is that, in today's na
tional economy, workers frequently change jobs and move across state
lines. It is in the best interests of corporations nationwide for states to
decide inevitable disclosure cases uniformly.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the need for cogent
trade secret law and analysis in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.16 The
court in that case determined that federal patent law does not preempt
protection under state trade secret law.77 More importantly for this
analysis, however, the Supreme Court recognized the basic principles
behind trade secret law: " [t]he maintenance of standards of commer
cial ethics and the encouragement of invention."78 The Court in
Kewanee was interpreting Ohio law, but spoke in general terms about
"trade secret law," thereby recognizing and acknowledging that while
trade secret law is state law and specifics may differ, it is uniform in
principle.79 Speaking generally, the Court gave force to the argument
that trade secrets not only follow a basic line of analysis across the
country but also that they have a unique and distinct line of analysis as
their own area of law.80
B.

The Early Development of Inevitable Disclosure

While trade secrets developed into a distinct area of law, inevitable
disclosure did not originate as a piece of the trade secret analysis.
Early cases of inevitable disclosure sometimes employed various ele
ments of trade secrets analysis, but determined the case by taking an

75. MILGRIM, supra note 26, § 1.01(3) at 1 -44.
76. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
77. See id. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (reaffirming the decision that state trade secret Jaws
were not preempted by patent Jaws and citing aspects of trade secret Jaw such as the fact that
it provides far weaker protection than patent Jaw because the product is not protected from
copy or reverse engineering, but only misappropriation).
78. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475.
79. Id. at 475-76.
80. See id. at 493:
Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years.
Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from the
need for the other . . . . Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the effi
cient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor
by contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it. Congress, by its si
lence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade se
cret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free
to grant protection to trade secrets.
Id.
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equitable approach, fashioning a solution analogous to an implied or
constructive trust.81 The constructive trust analogy is particularly apt
because these courts sought a solution to a problem of an employee
possessing a trade secret of his former employer, without the ability to
sever it from his knowledge. The courts fashioned an equitable solu
tion. They could not take the information away from the employee, so
they found ways to compensate him for his loss of mobility protecting
the company who actually owned the secret. In the same way, the im
plied constructive trust has long solved problems arising when a party
holds actual property belonging to another.82
For example, in the 1960s a federal court in Michigan grappled
with the distinction between an employee who threatens to disclose a
trade secret and an employee who has made no threat but whose
background knowledge is itself the problem.83 That court recognized
the unique remedial problems accompanying an inevitable disclosure
case. The Allis-Chalmers court was unwilling to make the employee
completely unemployable. In effect, the court made the former em
ployee the constructive trustee of the secret information by prohibit
ing him from working on machines of similar design. While the analy
sis outlined in this Note leads to a similar outcome, the Allis-Chalmers
court did not engage in the standard process of evaluating an alleged

81. DELUXE BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1515, 1517 (6th ed., 1990) (describing a re
sulting trust and referencing the constructive trust as "[a) trust imposed by law when prop
erty is transferred under circumstances suggesting that the transferor did not intend for the
transferee to have the beneficial interest in the property. - Also termed implied trust . . . . );
76 AM. JUR. 2d Trusts § 200 (1992) ("A constructive trust - sometimes referred to as a legal
fiction or a fiction of equity . . . is not a technical trust, but an implied trust."); see also Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) ("A constructive trust is the
formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been
acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.").
"

82.

See 76

AM. JUR. 2d

Trusts §

201 (1992):

The constructive trust remedy is not limited to instances of actual or constructive fraud but
may arise because of equitable principles other than fraud . . . . Some courts have imposed a
constructive trust where a confidential or fiduciary duty has been breached and a third party
unjustly enriched as a result of that breach, even absent wrongdoing by the party unjustly
enriched; thus, under the constructive trust theory, equity may collect proceeds from an inno
cent party in order to protect the equitable rights of those who have suffered the wrong.
Id.

(emphasis added).

83. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'! Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654
(E.D. Mich. 1966) ("The virtual impossibility of [defendant) performing all of his prospec
tive duties for [his new employer] to the best of his ability, without in effect giving it the
benefit of [plaintiff's) confidential information, makes a simple injunction against disclosure
and use of this information inadequate."). The court thus granted an injunction allowing the
defendant to work at the competitor but prohibiting work on the particular type of equip
ment about which he had internalized trade secrets of his former employer. Allis-Chalmers
provided very little insight into the test it used to grant the injunction and left the reader
with the feeling that the court felt an injunction to be appropriate but could not effectively
reason under trade secrets law as to why. Inevitable disclosure gave it a solution that seemed
equitable. See id.
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trade secret violation. The court only used the trade secret concept to
determine that a fiduciary interest existed.84
In 1978, a federal district court in Ohio used Allis-Chalmers as the
sole citation to accompany the sentence: "There is considerable sup
port for that proposition [inevitable disclosure] in the books. "85 Yet,
the Ohio court also fashioned a solution that was equitable in nature
- also much like a constructive trust.86 This court limited the former
employee's employability, but required the former employer to pay
for that limitation. Several pre-PepsiCo courts used inevitable disclo
sure but the standards used by those courts to decide the cases var
ied.87 For instance, some confused the determination of whether a
trade secret existed and would be inevitably disclosed with the deter
mination of the validity of a covenant not to compete or a confidenti
ality agreement.88
In 1985, one court used the words inevitable disclosure as a part of
the steps of a standard trade secret analysis.89 While this court did not
provide any explanation or guidance and was not followed, its decision
suggested two things: (1) the court was looking for an established doc-

84. The court did consider what might qualify as a trade secret. See id at 653. This is an
important first step in what should become the doctrinal analysis.
85. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953 at *15
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978). The plaintiff argued for barring the defendant from working for
the competitor for a limited period of time because, "in the proposed position as presi
dent . . . it would be inevitable that he would use the very trade secret information which he
has agreed not to use." Id. at *14-15. The Emery court determined "it is a necessary conclu
sion based on the facts that there is an inevitable and imminent danger of disclosure of plain
tiff's trade secrets. It will be virtually impossible for the defendant to perform his prospective
duties for [competitor] without in effect giving [competitor] the benefit of plaintiff's confi
dential information." Id. at *17. Except for determining that a threat of disclosure allowed
an injunction in Ohio, the Emery court did not proceed into any deeper analysis of the ele
ments of the "inevitable disclosure" than the discourse described above. See id.
86. See supra notes 81-82 (discussing the constructive trust analogy). As in the case of a
constructive trust, this court was faced with the need to fashion an equitable solution that
would serve the needs of the owner of the trade secret held by the employee, without creat
ing inequity for the employee who did no wrong. This court took the bold step of actually
crafting a de jure covenant not to compete by granting the injunction but requiring the plain
tiff to pay compensation to the former employee who could not work in his chosen field.
Emery, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953, at *19-20.
87. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., No. 91-203, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1395 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 1991) (discussing the "imminent threat of disclosure" and the need for
evidence of bad faith); Standard Brands v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (deter
mining inevitability of disclosure could not be presumed from employment in a managerial
capacity); Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (using the
technical expertise of the defendant and the fact that the new employer had not sought out
the employee prior to termination of the previous employment as a part of the determina
tion of no inevitable disclosure).
88. Surgider Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 695 (D. Minn. 1986).
89. Id. ("The fourth element of the trade secret cause of action requires proof that there
is an intention on the part of the defendants to use or disclose the putative trade secrets, or
alternatively, that under the circumstances of the case, there is a high degree of probability
of inevitable disclosure.").
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trine rather than just crafting an equitable solution without precedent;
and (2) the literature and case law gave it the idea that inevitable dis
closure was a standard element of trade secret analysis.
In some courts, inevitable disclosure of trade secrets became a part
of the decision to grant a preliminary injunction pending the determi
nation of the validity of the covenant not to compete.90 Other courts
equated inevitable disclosure with threatened misappropriation.91
Even in 1990 at least one court still rested its decision to grant an in
evitable disclosure preliminary injunction on an early equity case,
without providing much in the way of explanation or analysis, except
to imply that the facts of the early equity case were similar to the
problem at hand.92 Despite the obvious connection between inevitable
disclosure and trade secrets, the two developed separately. Inevitable
disclosure became nothing more than a set of words put into quotation
marks to solve a problem for which traditional trade secrets analysis
could fashion no solution. The doctrine was in disarray when the Sev
enth Circuit adopted it in PepsiCo.

90. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) (ac
knowledging that trade secrets could be disclosed even in the best of good faith and granting
preliminary injunction pending an action challenging a covenant not to compete would likely
be valid).
91. See Int'! Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 n.1 (D. Minn.
1992) (relying on FMC v. Varco and concluding that "the Eighth Circuit has neither ac
cepted nor rejected the 'inevitable disclosure' doctrine where the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals enjoined an employer from 'placing or maintaining [the employee] in a position that
poses an inherent threat of disclosure"); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1395, at *20 (discussing the 'imminent threat of disclosure' and the need for evidence of bad
faith in order to prove inevitable disclosure and concluding that, "[u]nlike SJ Handling,
Squibb has not demonstrated that Leise intends to disclose, or that Hollister intends to use,
Squibb's protected information. In addition, unlike SJ Handling, Hollister has taken meas
ures to protect against Leise's disclosure of Squibb's confidential information"); Teradyne,
Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (commenting that
the allegation that a high degree of probability of inevitable and immediate disclosure con
stitutes a threat to misappropriate trade secrets may have merit, recognizing that there is
caselaw to justify an injunction against an employee working in a specialized field based on
knowledge gained from a former employer, but deciding, "[h]ere there is no allegation that
defendants have in fact threatened to use Teradyne's secrets or that they will inevitably do
so. An allegation that the defendants said they would use secrets or disavowed their confi
dentiality agreements would serve this purpose"). A very recent note on this topic also falls
prey to the assumption that inevitable disclosure is addressed in this manner in the UTSA.
Miller, supra note 1 1 , at 50.
92. See Norand Corp. v. Parkin, 785 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (N.D. Iowa 1990) ("The Emery
court reasoned that an injunction prohibiting non-disclosure of proprietary information
would be insufficient as the defendant in that case could not help but use his knowledge in
his employment with the competitor company. Consequently, the court essentially created a
non-compete agreement."). The Norand court essentially bypassed all of the intervening
cases and cited to Emery Industries, Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15953, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978) to justify its decision to grant a preliminary injunc
tion based on the likelihood of success in proving the need for a court created non-compete
agreement. While the use of Emery was a wise move by Norand, the lack of acknowledge
ment of any doctrine of inevitable disclosure is telling.
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This Note argues that inevitable disclosure developed separately
from trade secrets, and, to avoid confusion, divides the two. The early
cases, however, demonstrate at least an awareness of the connection
to trade secrets law and judges may have even thought that the two
would develop in conjunction with each other. In fact, 30 years ago,
two cases that could easily be defined as inevitable disclosure cases
sparked the interest of trade secrets practitioners.93 At least one
author predicted, based on these two early cases, that inevitable dis
closure would become an important piece of trade secrets analysis.94
That same author also thought inevitable disclosure needed definition

93. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (in
volving two companies competing to design space suits for the Apollo project). The court
recognized that because of Wohlgemuth's highly technical and specialized expertise, his was
a unique case:
We have no doubt that Wohlgemuth had the right to take employment in a competitive
business, and to use his knowledge (other than trade secrets) and experience, for the benefit
of his new employer, but a public policy demands commercial morality, and courts of equity
are empowered to enforce it by enjoining an improper disclosure of trade secrets known to
Wohlgemuth by virtue of his employment. Under the American doctrine of free enterprise,
Goodrich is entitled to this protection.
Id.; see also E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 436
(Del. Ch. 1964) (dealing with an employee who worked on highly specialized chemical proc
esses and saying with relation to the speculative nature of a finding of inevitability:

Courts are frequently called upon to draw such conclusions based on a weighing of the prob
abilities, and while a conclusion that a certain result will probably follow may not ultimately
be vindicated, courts are nonetheless entitled to decide or "predict" the likely consequences
arising from a given set of facts and to grant legal remedies on that basis.).
The American Potash court also believed its decision to be of significance for future
trade secrets cases:
Tlie court fully recognizes that this is a case of great social and industrial significance both on
the question of the right to relief and, if established, the scope thereof . . . . The "interests"
involved are as easy to state as they are difficult to protect, particularly in the face of the
ever-increasing complexity of present day technology.
Am. Potash, 200 A.2d at 437.

94. An insightful note in the Virginia Law Review described these two cases and used
them to demonstrate that employee knowledge of trade secrets would pose increasingly
complex problems for courts. That author recognized then that employee knowledge was
becoming increasingly intertwined with employer trade secrets in a way that would cause
much difficulty with the concept of trade secret misappropriation:
If it were an easy matter to decide whether particular knowledge is a trade secret or part of a
technical employee's general competence; if it were easy to determine in a trial whether par
ticular knowledge has been disclosed; if it were easy to assess damages which realistically
compensate the owner of a secret improperly revealed - then industrial piracy would pres
ent few problems for the lawyer . . . . An injunction against disclosure does not solve the first
employer's problem of proving disclosure if the employee is undeterred and the injunction
must be enforced; nor does such an injunction reach involuntary or inadvertent disclosure,
which is a real possibility even if the employee consciously attempts not to reveal trade se
crets to his new employer.
Note, Inductions to Protect Trade Secrets - The Goodrich and DuPont Cases, 51 VA. L.
REV. 917, 920 (1965).
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as a trade secrets doctrine.95 Despite that author's prescient projec
tions, however, the two have not been combined completely.
C.

PepsiCo 's

Undefined Doctrine

In 1995, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in PepsiCo gave inevitable
disclosure prominence as a "doctrine" within the larger structure of
trade secrets law and purported to define it. This decision sparked a
proliferation of opinions in state and federal courts and an abundance
of scholarly comment. Yet, the Seventh Circuit did not delineate a
doctrine that fit neatly into the standard trade secrets format. As a re
sult, the many courts that have tried to follow PepsiCo have failed to
apply the doctrine of inevitable disclosure uniformly. These courts' in
consistencies demonstrate the lack of doctrinal framework within the
PepsiCo decision.

1.

PepsiCo's

Inevitable Disclosure Decision

In PepsiCo, as in all inevitable disclosure cases, the court was
asked to reconcile the employer's rights in the trade secret and the
employee's rights in mobility. In PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit's solu
tion was to rest its decision in the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. As
a result, PepsiCo sparked a modern fascination with this relatively old
theory and granted it the title and importance of "doctrine."96
Unfortunately, the PepsiCo court employed a mode of analysis
that is difficult to pinpoint and seems even harder for courts to follow
in other cases.97 The PepsiCo court began by acknowledging that de
fendant.s did not dispute the existence of the plaintiff's trade secrets.98

95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1 118 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) ("The PepsiCo decision has given new life to the theory of inevitable disclosure.
Previously, courts had recognized the theory, but were reluctant to apply it because of strong
public policies in favor of employee mobility.").
97. Even Milgrim's treatise demonstrates confusion with the doctrine and PepsiCo's interpretation. See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 5.02(3)(e) n.47a:
Inasmuch as PepsiCo pushed the inevitability doctrine into new - and arguably, inappro
priate - areas, enjoining the employment of the former marketing director of an insignifi
cant participant in the field by the industry leader, the district court's reliance suggests that
PepsiCo's value will not be in what was its aberrational holding, based seemingly upon the
trial court's satisfaction that the individual defendant had been less than forthright in testi
mony, but rather'for the mainstream proposition that employees have the right to engage in
competitive employment and there must be a constellation of factors before that competitive
employment, absent a valid restrictive covenant, will be enjoined.
Id.

98. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995). This is significant
because information's status as a trade secret is sometimes a hard-fought issue in the courts.
See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 1.09:
[T)his section categorizes many of the cases in which a court has expressly or by implication
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The court continued by conflating threatened misappropriation with
inevitable disclosure and using as its base of support cases of threat
ened misappropriation.99 Then the court determined that substantial
evidence existed that Redmond possessed "extensive and intimate
knowledge" about PCNA's strategic goals.100 Reiterating an assertion
of an earlier case, the court recognized that, "the mere fact that a per
son assumed a similar position at a competitor does not, without more,
make it 'inevitable that he will use or disclose . . . trade secret informa
1
tion . . . . ' " 01 While acknowledging that this was not a "typical" trade
secret situation, the court determined that it fell within the realm of
protection.102
The court finished by muddying the analysis and noting that the
district court found that Redmond's actions in pursuing his new job
displayed a lack of candor and "proof of [his and his new employer's]
willingness to misuse PCNA trade secret[s] . ''103 Thus, the court's stan
dard seemed to require a showing that a trade secret exists, a showing
beyond j ust intimate knowledge of the trade secret by the employee,
and finally some significance to an intent to use the secret. The Pep
siCo court did not, however, clearly delineate its actions. Its final rea
soning seemed to rest on a belief that Redmond or Quaker would act
in bad faith and a "demonstrated inevitability" that Redmond would
rely on the trade secrets in his new position.104 Therefore, it is possible
the PepsiCo court had before it a case of threatened misappropriation,
and at the least muddied the analysis by suggesting that the injunction
was supported by an indication of bad faith.

found a trade secret to exist or not to exist . . . perusal of the following list will show many in
stances, particularly with reference to customer lists and business . . . secrets, where different
jurisdictions reach contrary conclusions concerning trade secret status with respect to essen
tially identical matters.
Id.

99. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
100. Id. at 1269.
101. Id. at 1268 (quoting AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1 199, 1207 (7th Cir.
1987)).
102. See id. at 1269 ("This type of trade secret problem may arise less often, but it never
theless falls within the realm of trade secret protection under the present circumstances.").
Oddly, the PepsiCo court cited FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'!, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir.
1982), for the proposition that, "[e]ven assuming the best of good faith, [defendant] will have
difficulty preventing his knowledge of . . . manufacturing techniques from infiltrating his
work." PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. This suggests that the court recognized that inevitable dis
closure was not a "threatened disclosure" nor did it require bad faith. The court does not,
however, rest on that analysis.
103. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270.
104. Id. at 1271 (upholding the injunction based on the "demonstrated inevitability that
Redmond would rely on PCNA trade secrets in his new job at Quaker [and] the district
court's reluctance to believe that Redmond would refrain from disclosing these secrets in his
new position . . . ).
"
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Courts' Misapplication of PepsiCo

Inevitable disclosure did not develop with a coherent definition
consistent with a typical trade secrets determination because it devel
oped outside of trade secrets law. The Seventh Circuit failed to supply
such a definition. PepsiCo's legacy includes numerous bar journal arti
cles and law review notes and articles attempting to describe the struc
ture of the PepsiCo decision and its implications for trade secrets law
in general and preventative client counseling in particular.105 While
sparked a proliferation in the use of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine,106 it did not provide a coherent standard for subsequent
courts to follow. Other courts attempting to "follow" PepsiCo have di
verged, without demonstrating a clear understanding of the rule they
purport to follow.
The first group of cases, in which courts say they have used Pep
siCo to obtain equitable results even when inevitable disclosure may

PepsiCo

not have directly applied, cite

PepsiCo

as containing some factor not

actually present in the PepsiCo opinion. They appear to be looking for
some sort of authority on which to base their opinions. For example,
in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart,107 a district court in Indiana
first decided that the facts did not indicate any reason to believe the
employee would reveal the secret.108 This finding should have been the
end of the analysis because once the court finds that the employee will
not reveal the secret in his daily duties or in bad faith, the court has no
need for a remedy. Oddly, the Lockhart court did not end its analysis
there but proceeded to distinguish PepsiCo.109 This court had no need
for PepsiCo because it had already concluded that the defendant

105. See, e.g., D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable" Trade Secret Misappropriation After Pep
siCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 537 PU/Pat 199 (1998); Koh, supra note 13; Scott D. Marrs, Trade
Secrets - Preliminary Relief In Trade Secret Cases, 61 TEX. B.J. 880 (1998); Alan L. Sullivan,
Is It Really 'Inevitable'? Dynamics of a Preliminary Injunction Proceeding in a Scientific
Trade Secrets Case, SC7l ALI-ABA 159 (1998); Weinstein, supra note 13; Whaley, supra
note 14; Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclo
sure of Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717 (1996).
106. A search of Shepard's citations conducted in January 2002 reveals 79 cases citing
the PepsiCo decision for the inevitable disclosure proposition. See also Maxxim Medical, Inc.
v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("California has adopted the Uniform
Trade Secret Act ("UTSA"). Under the UTSA, a court may enjoin actual or threatened
misappropriation . . . . In the landmark case of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond . . . the court ap
plied this provision of the UTSA to create what is now considered the 'inevitable disclosure'
doctrine." (citations omitted)).
107. 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
108. See id. at 682.
109. See id. ("Because misappropriation does not appear to be inevitable, or even seri
ously threatened, this case is different from PepsiCo v. Redmond.").
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would not disclose the secret.110 The only explanation offered in the
court's opinion came in the form of references to inevitable disclosure
as a subset of threatened misappropriation. The procedure outlined in
this Note would have given the Lockhart court a standard analysis to
follow. Rather than having to interpret the PepsiCo case and look for
parallels, the court could have stopped at the point of determining that
no disclosure of trade secret was threatened nor was the employee ca
pable of inevitably disclosing it.
Similarly, in Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,111 the court first found
that the plaintiff company made no efforts to protect secrets.112 The
court then proceeded to cite PepsiCo and define inevitable disclo
sure.113 Finally, the court renamed the doctrine the "inevitable discov
ery/contempt theory " 114 and rejected use of the doctrine because there
was no on-going relationship between the defendant and plaintiff.115
This has nothing to do with a trade secrets analysis. This court missed
the important point that if there were no efforts made to protect se
crets, then no trade secret existed. There was no need to reach the
employee's knowledge because the company did not adequately make
out its prima facie case. Far from looking for a standard analysis,
Glaxo created its own and seemed to base it on a factor not even pres
ent in the PepsiCo decision.
The second group of cases interpret the PepsiCo definition of in
evitable disclosure as a subset of threatened misappropriation.116
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon exemplifies this type of decision.117 That
court, citing PepsiCo, determined that North Carolina recognized a
number of factors to be considered:

1 10. Possibly, this piece of dictum was meant to indicate that that court itself had con
sidered whether disclosure might be "inevitable" and discarded the idea. Even if that is the
case, it still demonstrates a lack of recognition or understanding of a coherent doctrine.
1 1 1 . 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1302 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
1 12. Recall, this means that there are no trade secrets that could have been misappro
priated by the employee. See supra note 19.
1 13. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1303. Oddly, the Glaxo court defined inevitable disclosure as
being applicable only to "narrow technological fields" where an employee could not "forget"
things learned on the job. While technological fields are quite susceptible to inevitable dis
closure problems, Redmond's job in PepsiCo was not one in a "narrow technological field."
Id.
1 14. Id.
1 15. Id.; see also Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (claiming
to have a case different from PepsiCo because both parties acted in reasonably good faith
but deciding the case based on inevitable disclosure anyway).
116. The reason inevitable disclosure becomes confusing for many courts is because the
UTSA covers actual and threatened misappropriation. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2,
14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.").
1 17. See Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1459-60 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
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(1) The circumstances surrounding the termination of employment,

(2)

the importance of the employee's job or position, (3) the type of work

performed by the employee, and ( 4) the kind of information sought to be

protected and the value or need of the competitor for it. . . . Thus . . .
when the trade secret was clearly established and the possibility of dis
closure high and the value to the competitor great, an injunction would
issue even when there had been no bad faith or underhanded dealing by
the former employee or the competitor.1 18

The Merck court seemed surprised that an injunction could issue even
without "bad faith or underhanded dealing. " The court went on to
analyze the application of the doctrine in other states. It found that
other states considered the degree of competition between the old and
new employer, the new employer's efforts to safeguard the former
employer's trade secrets, and the former employee's lack of forth
rightness.119 The court also noted that the employee's misrepresenta
tions provided a basis for questioning his ability to comply with the
confidentiality agreement - a clear case of threatened misappropria
tion.120 The Merck opinion is highly dependent on drawing parallels to
PepsiCo, but demonstrates that the issue before the court was threat
ened misappropriation. It is quite likely the Merck facts presented a
fine line between threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclo
sure. Because the Merck court did not have a standard analysis to fol
low, the court conflated the two. Also, rather than simply trying to
draw parallels to PepsiCo without a coherent underlying structure on
which to base those parallels, the Merck court could have benefited
from looking at the solutions used by other courts following the same
analysis.
In another example, a district court in New York determined that
the decision in PepsiCo was heavily influenced by the " 'lack of forth
rightness' and 'out and out lies' by the former employee. " 121 This court
distinguished its case from PepsiCo because there was no evidence of
any attempt at deception. The court, therefore, decided that it was not
following PepsiCo when it granted an injunction based on its determi
nation that, " 'even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful
whether the defendant could completely divorce his knowledge of the

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1460.
120. Id. In Glaxo, the court cited PepsiCo and other cases and said of inevitable disclo
sure, "the latter doctrine bars the employment of a competitor's former employee who had
developed intimate expert knowledge of that competitor's confidential information in a nar
row technological field, on the grounds that it would not be possible for that employee to
'forget' or refrain from relying upon the confidential information," suggesting its own inter
pretation of the standard set by PepsiCo. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1303.
121. Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Arguably, these
were factors in the PepsiCo decision, but the decision was not heavily influenced by them,
nor did they even appear necessary to the decision.
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trade secrets from any . . . work he might engage in' with [the new em
ployer] ."122 Ironically, the New York court's comments demonstrate
that its holding was based on the real definition of inevitable disclo
sure. Yet the court explained that by doing so it was deviating from
PepsiCo. Again, the court's dependence on the PepsiCo facts pre
vented a bigger-picture analysis as a standard part of the trade secrets
inquiry.
A Texas district court123 recently found that the factors used by the
PepsiCo court included: the employee's possession of extensive trade
secret knowledge above and beyond general skills; the responsibilities
with the old and new employers were parallel; and deceit on the part
of the defendant.124 This is an even more dangerous interpretation of
PepsiCo. As demonstrated above, some courts mistakenly assume that
PepsiCo provides a clear definition and then follow or deviate by
drawing parallels. But this court gives the impression that a coherent
doctrine of inevitable disclosure exists and is exemplified by PepsiCo
and then, making matters worse, misinterprets PepsiCo.125
In a final category of post-PepsiCo cases, some courts reject out
right the PepsiCo analysis.126 For instance, the Northern District of
Iowa, in

1997, completely redefined the doctrine for its own use.127

122. Id. at 635 (citing Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1234 (W.D.N.Y.
1994)).
123. See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("Al
though only a California Superior Court has had the opportunity to determine whether to
follow Redmond, this Court believes that the California Supreme Court would follow the
overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions to do so."), reversed, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir.
1999). While the 5th Circuit reversed this case without opinion, it is very possible that the
court recognized that the Maxxim court had placed too much faith in the steadfastness of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine and its place in the law of trade secrets. Only after this opinion
did California officially recognize and accept the inevitable disclosure doctrine at the appel
late level (the Maxxim decision was decided based on California law).
124. See Maxxim, 51 F. Supp. at 785-86. Oddly enough, the interpretations of the "bad
blood" as a part of the PepsiCo decision seem to grow stronger as the years go on. The ac
tual decision seems to mention the lack of forthrightness as an additional reason after de
termining the inevitable disclosure while the Merck court emphasized it as a major factor
and the Maxxim court calls it "deceit." Even those courts that try to base their decisions on
PepsiCo do not interpret it uniformly. This court believed the Bridgestone/Firestone decision
to be the only one which had not chosen to follow PepsiCo and concluded that Bridge
stone/Firestone had done so only because of factual differences. See id. at 786.
125. As another example, in Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs.,
Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999), a state supreme court cited PepsiCo, among others,
and then based its decision on factors clearly evidencing threatened misappropriation.
126. Also in this third category of cases are those that simply ignore the existence of
PepsiCo. DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 1 16914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577, *76
(N.Y. Nov. 5, 1 997), relied on Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) to
say "this finding is bolstered by the fact that there is a high probability of 'inevitable disclo
sure' of trade secrets in this case. Injunctive relief may issue where a former employee's new
job function will inevitably lead her to rely on trade secrets belonging to a former em
ployer." The court held that the former employee would likely disclose plaintiff's trade se
crets "to aid his new employer and his own future . . . . " This court had no real standard in
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[Plaintiff] argued that [defendant] will 'inevitably' disclose trade secrets
if he works for [new employer]. This Court has read that argument
broadly in order to decide whether the analysis supports [plaintiff's]
claim that [defendant] violated the noncompetition agreement because
he is 'likely' to disclose proprietary information. This Court has therefore
assumed for the purposes of this analysis that "likely to disclose" is the
same as "inevitably will disclose."128

That same court used PepsiCo to show that a court has discretion to
decide whether the defendant's previous untrustworthiness could be
the basis for an injunction.129 The Iowa court then held that the plain
tiff had shown deceit but no inevitability and refused the inj unction.U0
It is difficult to determine exactly how this court interpreted the
PepsiCo decision, but the Iowa court obviously rejected the inevitable
disclosure analysis.
As this Note has demonstrated, uniformity is crucial to trade se
crets law and is one of the major objectives of the UTSA and the
courts of the majority of states as a result. Trade secrets law is the
most appropriate area of law in which to ground inevitable disclosure.
As such, inevitable disclosure should be made a standard part of the
analysis and should be defined uniformly by courts across the country.
PepsiCo may have provided an example to follow, but these courts do
not follow it consistently, nor do they even all interpret it in the same
way. As a result, inevitable disclosure is in need of formal definition
beyond simply citing PepsiCo as the example. This Note has at
tempted to provide that definition and standard analysis.

CONCLUSION
This Note argues that courts should adopt a uniform definition of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine that conforms to standard trade se
cret analysis. Such a result would fill the gap that exists between
threatened misappropriation and general employee knowledge. This
result makes sense based on the development of the inevitable disclo
sure doctrine. This solution provides greater protection for employers
and employees by offering certainty at the outset of any employment
relationship. Further, it grants courts discretion at the remedy phase to
protect the rights of employees.

mind and in fact appeared to decide the case based on a threatened misappropriation while
using the phrase "inevitable disclosure" to adorn the opinion.
127. See APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 860-61 (N.D. Iowa. 1997).
128. Id. at 860 n.6.
129. See id. at 860-61.
130. Id. at 861.

